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This Synopsis surveys the major events that occurred in the
Law of the Sea between March, 1977, and December, 1978. It dis-
cusses the Sixth and Seventh Sessions of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS M) at length
as well as other significant events that occurred during this pe-
riod. Primary sources consulted in compiling this Synopsis in-
clude International Legal Materials, the United Nations Monthly
Chronicle, the United States Department of State Bulletin, United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News, the Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, the Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Christian Science
Monitor, and the London Times.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAw OF THE SEA
Background
UNCLOS I held two exhaustive sessions in 1977 and 1978 in an
effort to decide the control and management of the world's
oceans.' The negotiations during the last two years focused pri-
1. Previous sessions of UNCLOS III were held in New York City in 1973; in
Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974; in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1975; and in New York City
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marily on resolving the main problem facing the diplomats-the
management of mineral nodules on the ocean floor.2 Because of
the impasse this issue has caused, many commentators and schol-
ars have called for a reevaluation of United States involvement in
the negotiations. 3 The following section summarizes the intense
debate within UNCLOS Ill that has occurred during the last two
years.
Sixth Session of UNCLOS III
The Sixth Session of UNCLOS H was held in New York City
from May 23 to July 15, 1977.4 The Revised Single Negotiating
in 1976. See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1976-1977, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 718, 719-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
2. For a discussion of United States involvement in this area, see text accom-
panying notes 64-74 infra.
3. Many articles have been written on whether the United States should con-
tinue to participate in UNCLOS. See generally United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: Panel Discussion at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 12 INTL LAw. 21 (1978). For a discussion of reasons for continued
United States participation, see Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock,
55 FOREIGN AFF. 598 (1977). Professor Charney contends that a go-it-alone attitude
on the part of the United States would have detrimental repercussions on the right
to unimpeded transit through straits and on the development of relations with
States that border the straits. Professor Charney further contends that the United
States has an ample supply of the minerals produced from seabed mining and that
because of the political instability among land-mining States, an OPEC-type cartel
is unlikely to develop among the mineral producers.
Some commentators think that the seabed issue should be severed from the UN-
CLOS negotiations and decided separately because of the impasse over the issue.
Smith, The Seabed Negotiations and the Law of the Sea Conference-Ready for a
Divorce?, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 43 (1977). See also Dickey, Should the Law of the Sea
Conference Be Saved?, 12 INT'L LAw. 1 (1978). For a discussion of reasons for
United States withdrawal from UNCLOS, see Darman, The Law of the Sea: Re-
thinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1978). Darman contends that current
negotiations have not taken into account United States interests in seabed mining
and that the United States should reject the present treaty. Accordingly, failure to
reach agreement at UNCLOS III would not harm American strategic interests.
Darman suggests that the United States should proceed with negotiating a series
of mini-treaties which would take into account American economic interests and
allow developing States to participate and share in the profits. Id. at 393-95.
Other commentators think that even without an UNCLOS agreement, the
emerging international customary law will suffice to solve the problems now being
negotiated, especially the problem of seabed mining. Laylin, Emerging Customary
Law of the Sea, 10 INT'L LAW. 669 (1976). See also Alexander, Cameron, & Nixon,
Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 9 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 10-
16 (1977).
4. Informal discussions were held in Geneva beginning on February 28, 1977,
at the initiative of Jens Evensen, Norway's Minister for Law of the Sea and a key
negotiator in UNCLOS. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1977, § 1, at 14, col. 2. The talks lasted
until March 11, 1977, with more than 80 States represented. Primarily, participants
sought a compromise on the seabed mining issue. Id. Mar. 12, 1977, § 1, at 37, col. 5.
This session apparently made progress when Elliot Richardson, newly appointed
chief delegate of the United States at UNCLOS III, committed the United States to
finance up to 20% of the Enterprise. The Enterprise is the operating arm of the
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Text (RSNT), which had been drawn up at the end of the 1976
session, served as the basis for the 1977 negotiations.5
The Sixth Session, like previous sessions, was divided into
three Committees. 6 The First Committee, which is responsible
for the management and control of deep seabed resources beyond
national jurisdiction, dealt with the most difficult question facing
the entire Conference: Who will reap the riches from the ocean
floor? It has been estimated by the ocean mining industry that
the potato-sized nodules containing manganese, copper, nickel,
and cobalt are worth over three trillion dollars.
7
Compromise had seemed possible during the course of the ne-
gotiations, primarily because of the efforts of the Conference Vice
President, Jens Evensen of Norway. Evensen was the progenitor
of the "Evensen Text," which contained several proposed revi-
International Seabed Authority (ISA), which is to regulate seabed mining. Id.
May 23, 1977, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
The Austrian and Nigerian delegations promulgated a further proposal concern-
ing the Enterprise. Paper submitted by Ambassador Wolf, in Report of informal
consultations in Geneva 50 app. (Apr. 28, 1977), reprinted in 1 FORSCmmGSmSrruT
FR INTERNATIONALE PoLrrIn uND SICHER-Err, STIFIrNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLl-
TIK, DOKUMENTE DER DRrrTEN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER VEREINTEN NA-
TIONEN-NEW YORKER SESSION 1977, at 310, 351 (1977). Rather than creating one
Enterprise to deal with all mining activity, their proposal suggested that the ISA
"form a separate Enterprise for each mining venture, in partnership with a consor-
tium of states or their mining companies." Borgese, The Best Way to the Sea's
Riches?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 10, 1978, at 19, col. 2. The Enterprise would
contribute one-half the capital, appoint at least one-half the directors, and receive
at least one-half the profits. Id. This proposal was not accepted.
5. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS III OR 125
(1976).
6. The procedure for negotiating at the 1977 Conference was basically the
same as that for the 1976 Conference. Three separate Committees, based on re-
gional representation, were formed to define the problems that faced each Com-
mittee and to propose solutions. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 720
n.7.
For the 1977 session, delegates agreed that the Chairman of each Committee
would work closely with the President of UNCLOS III, who could offer his own
ideas as to the provisions being negotiated. However, each Chairman was free to
determine the "precise formulation" of the provisions to be incorporated into the
new text. United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: Explanatory
Memorandum on the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/WP. 10/Add. 1, reprinted in 16 h'r'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1099, 1100 (1977). This
procedure later caused dissension, especially as to the seabed issue, with respect
to differences between agreements reached in the First Committee and the text
actually included in the successor document to the RSNT, the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/VP. 10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III
OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1108 (1977).
7. Wash. Post, July 27, 1978, § A, at 18, col. 1.
sions to the RSNT.8 The Evensen Text retained the 'parallel sys-
tem" proposed at the 1976 Conference by then United States
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Under this compromise, a
private or State-owned mining group would propose two identical
areas of exploitation to the International Seabed Authority (ISA),
which would have exclusive control over deep seabed mining.
The proposal further would allow the ISA to have exclusive con-
trol over access to and development of the ocean floor.9 One site
would be mined by the Enterprise, the operating arm of the ISA,
and the other by the private or State-owned consortium.' 0 The
Evensen Text, however, limited the discretion of the ISA to refuse
contracts with mining companies."
The issue of resource policy has been especially important to
many of the mineral-producing members of the Group of 77,12
which fear that seabed mining will hurt their own land-based
mining industries. The Evensen Text is similar to the RSNT on
this issue in that it recognizes the need to ensure the viability of
the land-based producers. The amount of minerals to be mined
by both the ISA and private mining companies is limited to sixty
percent of the cumulative growth of the world market after seven
years.13
The Evensen Text revised the organizational structure of the
ISA and changed its voting procedure. It called for a chambered
system of voting, a complicated procedure that would give the
outnumbered developed States greater voting strength.14 A new
8. The Evensen Text is reprinted at 2 FORSCHUNGSINSTITuT FOR INTERNATIO-
NALE PouirK UND SICHERHErr, STIrUNG WISSENSCHAFr UND PoLIK, DoKUitENTE
DER DRIT=rN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER VEREINrEN NATIONEN-NEW YORKER SES-
SION 1977, at 420 (1977).
9. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 721.
10. Id.
11. Charney, United States Interests in Convention on the Law on the Sea: The
Case for Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRA SNAT'L L. 39, 61 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as United States Convention Interests]. When there is no conflict among ap-
plicants, the Evensen Text deems acceptance of a contract mandatory. Further-
more, the ISA must reject the contract within 60 days, or it will automatically be
deemed approved. Id. at 72-73 app.
12. The Group of 77, a faction within UNCLOS III, is composed of more than
115 developing States of the Third World. Although not always unified on all is-
sues, the Group generally views the issue of seabed mining as one that pits the
developing against the developed States.
13. The RSNT limits nickel production in the first 25 years of the ISA's opera-
tion so as not to exceed the percentage increase in the projected world nickel mar-
ket. The Evensen Text calls for limiting production for 20 years after 1980 to two-
thirds of the projected world increase. United States Convention Interests, supra
note 11, at 71 app.
14. The ISA contains two voting bodies, the Assembly and the Council. The
Assembly is composed of all States that are parties to the treaty. It operates on
the basis of one State, one vote, and is primarily concerned with general policy-
making. Law of the Sea Conference Status Report, Summer 1978: Hearing Before
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provision called for a review of the Enterprise every five years,
with a basic review of the workings of the ISA to be convened at
the end of twenty years.15 The Evensen Text also proposed that
the Sea-Bed Tribunal, created by the RSNT, be integrated into
the Law of the Sea Tribunal, which would adjudicate disputes
arising under the entire Convention.16
Finally, the United States proposed a plan for financing the En-
terprise. Basically, this plan calls for member States to guarantee
loans to the Enterprise based upon the percentage of their contri-
butions to the United Nations.' 7
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),18 released af-
ter the Sixth Session, represents the official UNCLOS position. It
contains many provisions that are in neither the RSNT nor the
Evensen Text.'9 The United States thinks that the ICNT in-
the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [herein-
after cited as 1978 Hearing].
The Council deals more with the specifics of resource exploration and exploita-
tion than with general policymaking. Hudson, For a Law of the Seas, CURRENT,
Dec., 1977, at 44, 48-49. The United States and other developed States capable of
seabed mining want the Council's composition to reflect "adequate protection to
the major economic interests affected by the deep sea-bed mining provisions of a
treaty." 1978 Hearing, supra at 5.
15. United States Convention Interests, supra note 11, at 75 app.
16. A Seabed Disputes Chamber would be established within the Law of the
Sea Tribunal. Note, Law of the Sea-The Integration of the System of Settlement of
Disputes under the Draft Convention as a Whole, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 84, 85 (1978). It
would also prohibit the Tribunal from deciding upon rules and procedures
adopted by the Assembly or the Council. United States Convention Interests,
supra note 11, at 75 app.
This arrangement has been seen as a major contribution by developing States at
UNCLOS III. Adede, Law of the Sea-Developing Countries' Contribution to the
Development of the Institutional Arrangements for the International Sea-bed
Authority, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 32-33 (1977). However, one author has claimed
that this restriction contravenes "fundamental principles of United States admin-
istrative law." Pietrowski, Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor: Implications
for American Law and Policy, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 43, 66 (1977).
17. The United States' share would be 25%. Wall St. J., June 14, 1977, at 23, col.
1.
18. Note 6 supra.
19. The ICNT was not finally released until several days after the official close
of the Sixth Session. The portion of the ICNT that deals with the seabed mining
issue was drafted under the chairmanship of Paul Engo of Cameroon. Elliot Rich-
ardson, United States Ambassador to UNCLOS II, charged that Engo and others
were responsible for changing the final text and thus making it unacceptable to
the United States. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1977, § 1, at 2, col. 1. See also note 39 and
accompanying text infra.
For a concise interpretation of the ICNT on the issue of seabed mining, see
Silkenat, Solving the Problem of the Deep Seabed: The Informal Composite Negoti-
creases the power of the ISA to accept or reject mining applica-
tions, thereby eliminating any reasonable assurance of access to
mining sites. 20 The ICNT also sets more stringent limits on the
production of minerals than did the Evensen Text2l and elimi-
nates the chambered voting system.22 It retains the twenty-year
review clause, but if the Conference failed after five years to
reach an agreement on the workings of the parallel system, the
parallel system would be be abolished.23 Furthermore, the ICNT
ating Text for the First Committee of UNCLOS III, 9 N.Y.U. J. INTL' L. & POL. 177
(1976).
20. Richardson, Law of the Sea Conference: Problems and Progress, 77 DEP'T
ST. Bumi. 389, 390 (1977). The ICNT can be read to give the ISA enough discretion-
ary power to enable it to mandate that miners contract directly with the Enter-
prise rather than with the Council. United States Convention Interests, supra note
11, at 72 app. The Enterprise is not subject to a set of negotiating principles as is
the Council.
Perhaps even more restrictive is Article 150 of the ICNT, which states that in
any negotiations, the ISA must take into consideration "the protection of develop-
ing countries from any adverse effects on their economics." ICNT, supra note 6,
art. 150. One commentator thinks that developing States would use this principle
to limit the quantity of minerals mined. Pietrowski, Hard Minerals on the Deep
Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV.
43, 64 (1977).
Alternatives to the parallel system have been proposed. See La Que, Different
Approaches to International Regulation of Exploitation of Deep-Ocean Ferroman.
ganese Nodules, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 477 (1978). La Que examines the different
approaches and discusses their advantages and disadvantages to developing
States. Another commentator has suggested a system similar to that used for land
control. This system would be based on Transferable Exploitation Rights (TER's),
which would be defined "in terms of permissible exploitation of presently discov-
ered resources per unit of area." The ISA would allocate TER's to developed
States or to private mining companies, based upon the creation of a world market.
This plan has two advantages: The developing States would benefit immediately,
and production would remain in the private sector. Note, Transferable Exploita-
tion Rights: An Allocation System for Oceans Resources, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 257, 274-
75 (1977).
Another alternative is a European proposal that would retain the parallel sys-
tem but would permit voluntary participation in mining operations by the Enter-
prise. Participation would be "limited to twenty percent in the case of first
generation mine-sites and to fifty percent in the case of second generation sites."
Conant & Conant, Resource Development and the Seabed Regime of UNCLOS III:
A Suggestion for Compromise, 18 VA. J. INTr'L L. 61, 66 (1977). Participation would
entitle the Enterprise to benefits from and training in the use of the technology
needed for exploitation. However, the Enterprise would be obliged to meet its
share of the financing costs. Presumably, however, it could be financed by an in-
stitute such as the World Bank. Id.
21. Article 150 of the ICNT states: "After the first seven years of the interim
period total production of minerals from nodules in the Area shall on a yearly ba-
sis not exceed 60 percent of the cumulative growth segment of the world nickel
demand ... ." ICNT, supra note 6, art. 150(1) (g) (B) (i).
22. Voting by the Council and the Assembly is based on a one-State, one-vote
principle. Id. art. 159(6). Substantive questions in the Council require a three-
fourths majority; procedural matters require only a simple majority. Id. art.
159(7). In the Assembly, substantive issues require a two-thirds majority, while
procedural issues require only a simple majority. Id. art. 157(6)-(7).
23. Id. art. 153(6).
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provides that the ISA may require a mining interest to transfer its
technology to the Enterprise as a precondition to contracting.24
Surprisingly, scientific research in the high seas arguably comes
under the control of the ISA25 even though this issue was not to
be resolved by the First Committee. The Committee's failure to
resolve the seabed mining issue led to a call for reevaluating
United States participation in future UNCLOS negotiations.26
The Second Committee dealt with the problem of jurisdiction
within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the high
seas. The ICNT, like the RSNT, proposes a twelve-mile territorial
sea and transit rights through the various ocean straits.27 The
Committee made substantial progress in formulating different de-
grees of jurisdiction over ocean waters. The areas covered by the
ICNT include internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone,
EEZ, continental shelf extending beyond 200 miles, and high
seas.28 The resolution of access to the EEZ by neighboring
24. Id. art. 151(2) (ii), 8(b); id. Annex II, arts. 4-5.
25. Id. arts. 143, 151(7). Because of this provision and others in Committee M,
many ocean scientists in the United States have recommended that the United
States not accept the UNCLOS provisions on this issue. Ocean Scientists May
Wash Hands of Sea Law Treaty, 197 ScI. 645 (1977).
26. At a press conference, Elliot Richardson stated that because of a lack of
satisfactory progress on the seabed issue, he would recommend that the Carter
administration "undertake a most serious and searching review of both the sub-
stance and procedures of the conference." Wall St. J., July 21, 1977, at 14, col. 2.
Mr. Richardson found four other aspects of the ICNT unacceptable: the ISA au-
thority to force joint ventures as a precondition for access, the ICNT ambiguity on
the financial investment required of mining concerns, the ISA regulation of the
production of other minerals, and the ISA distribution of the benefits to States
that are not parties to the convention. Richardson, Law of the Sea Conference:
Problems and Progress, 77 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 389, 390-91 (1977).
27. ICNT, supra note 6, arts. 3, 37-44. The right of transit passage has been a
major concern for naval powers that maintain nuclear submarine fleets, such as
the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the right of innocent passage, as
applied in territorial waters, a submarine would have to surface while crossing a
strait if the strait were within a State's 12-mile limit. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14,
at 4-7.
28. Internal waters are those "waters on the landward side of the baseline of
the territorial sea." ICNT, supra note 6, art. 8(1). The ICNT provides for no right
to innocent passage unless such waters have not previously been considered inter-
nal. Id. art. 8(2). Thus, Chesapeake and San Francisco Bays qualify as internal
waters. Hudson, The International Struggle for a Law of the Sea, Buu. ATOM.
ScENTIsTs, Dec., 1977, at 14, 16. The territorial sea is 12 miles from the baseline.
Only the right of innocent passage through these waters exists. ICNT, supra arts.
3, 17. The contiguous zone runs from 12 to 24 miles from the baseline. Here the
coastal State may exercise control of "its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations." Id. art. 33. The EEZ extends from the end of the 12-mile territorial
sea to 200 miles from the baseline. Id. art. 57. Within the EEZ "the coastal state
coastal States remained unresolved, 29 as did the right of access by
landlocked States to the sea.
3 0
The Third Committee dealt with the issues of pollution and of
scientific research. The ICNT grants States the right to enact
laws preventing pollution from foreign ships within their territo-
rial seas. 3 ' The main problem confronting the Committee was the
issue of marine research within a State's EEZ.32 The Committee
[shall have] sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ig and managing the natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the sea-
bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters." Id. art. 56(1) (a).
The coastal State would control fishing within the EEZ. Id. art. 61. Scientific re-
search would also be affected within this zone. Id. art. 56(1) (b) (ii). For a discus-
sion of the issues relating to scientific research, see text accompanying notes 32-37
infra. Control of pollution is also within the jurisdiction of the territorial State,
"although states would be expected to cooperate with international and regional
bodies." Hudson, supra. The right of transit in the high seas is retained within
the EEZ. ICNT, supra art. 58.
The continental shelf jurisdiction allows a coastal State to have exploitation
rights over the shelf either to an area 200 miles out or to areas that "extend be-
yond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin." Id. art. 76. The end of this margin is
not defined. However, various formulae have been proposed. See note 57 infra.
After 10 years, States that do exploit the shelf beyond the 200-mile limit shall
contribute five percent of their earnings annually to the ISA. ICNT, supra art.
82(2). The ISA will then distribute such earnings on an equitable basis to develop-
ing States. Id. art. 82(4). This situation was viewed as a tradeoff between States
with large continental margins (generally the developed States such as the United
States) and the developing States. Hudson, supra. No Article in the ICNT re-
quires States to contribute from resources within the economic zone. However,
such a proposal has been made. The proposal is known as the "Barba Negro"
formula, named after the ship upon which many of the delegates met to discuss
the matter. See Logue, Carter's Ocean Opportunity, 104 CoiMoNwEAL 265, 268
(1977).
29. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 74.
30. Id. art. 125. The specific agreements between landlocked States and
transit States are left to negotiations. Id. art. 125(2). Thus, it remains unclear
whether landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States (LL/GDS) should
be given access as a matter of right rather than of license. No customs or taxes
are to be charged, "except charges levied for specific services rendered in connex-
ion with such traffic." Id. art. 127(1). However, no requirement exists for the
transit State to provide special port areas for use by the LL States. Id. arts. 128-
129.
Little progress was made as to the rights of the LL/GDS to the resources within
the EEZ. See Jayakumar, The Issue of the Rights of Landlocked and Geographi-
cally Disadvantaged States in the Living Resources of the Economic Zone, 18 VA.
J. INT'L L. 69 (1977).
31. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 221. This provision complies with the Carter ad-
ministration's goal to prevent pollution within American territorial waters. Rich-
ardson, Law of the Sea Conference: Problems and Progress, 77 DEP'T ST. BULw. 389,
390 (1977).
However, one commentator criticizes the ICNT on the grounds that it hampers
the coastal State from taking effective measures against pollution within its own
EEZ. Schneider, Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and
the Marine Environment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1977).
32. The area encompassed by the 200-mile EEZ is of major importance to
oceanographers because they conduct research within it. This fact explains the
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made progress on this problem by easing the restrictions that the
RSNT had imposed. Freedom to publish scientific data became
less restrictive,33 although the ICNT imposes upon the researcher
the duty to notify the coastal State of the proposed exploration
and to obtain its consent.34 The coastal State, however, is under a
duty to consent.35 Thus, if the coastal State does not respond
within six months after being notified and asked for permission, it
is presumed to have impliedly consented.3 6 The United States
generally favors these ICNT provisions.37
Seventh Session of UNCLOS III
The Seventh Session of UNCLOS HI met in Geneva from March
28 to May 19, 1978, and in New York City from August 21 to Sep-
tember 15, 1978.38 The ICNT, drafted during the Sixth Session,
served as the basis for negotiations. The delegates immediately
agreed that unilateral modification of the text would be forbidden.
cynicism displayed by ocean scientists toward the UNCLOS IlI texts allowing
strict coastal State control over oceanographic activity. Ocean Policy Committee
of the Commission on International Relations NAS-NRC, The Marine Scientific Re-
search Issue in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 197 ScI. 230 (1977). In 1976 ap-
proximately half the planned explorations by oceanographers were cancelled
because of insufficient cooperation from the coastal State whose waters were to be
explored. Cowen, Ocean Science in Peril, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 8, 1977, at
29, col. 14.
33. While the RSNT held that coastal State consent should be given for re-
search other than that involving economic exploration, it did contain statements
that may have placed a restraint on publication of scientific data from such re-
search. Oxman, The Third United Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1977 New York Session, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 57, 77 (1978).
34. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 246.
35. Id. art. 247(3). This Article outlines the circumstances under which a
coastal State may deny consent. These circumstances include areas of environ-
mental and economic concern and instances in which a researcher provides inac-
curate information. This provision may be read to limit discretionary abuse by
coastal States. Oxman, The Third United Nations' Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 57, 76 (1978).
36. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 253.
37. Richardson, Law of the Sea Conference: Problems and Progress, 77 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 389, 389-90 (1977).
38. At the outset the Conference seemed on the verge of collapse over reten-
tion of the President of UNCLOS, Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka.
Latin American States believed that he favored the LL States in their struggle to
obtain resource rights in the EEZ. Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1978, § A, at 21, col. 1.
These States also contended that because Amerasinghe was replaced by his gov-
ernment as ambassador to UNCLOS III, it would be a poor precedent to allow him
to remain in a personal capacity. Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1978, at 14, col. 2. This issue
was eventually decided in Amerasinghe's favor.
To avoid the problem of rewriting the text that occurred in the
Sixth Session, the delegates decided that the Committee
chairpersons would not be allowed to alter the text without the
consensus of all participating delegates.3 9
The First Committee's 40 proposed revisions to the ICNT remain
similar to the original ICNT with regard to mining-area access al-
though a major change occurred on the issue of production con-
trol.4 1 The United States came to an agreement with Canada, a
leading producer of nickel, on fixed-production controls. 42 The
production ceiling is to be calculated based upon a more exten-
sive set of variables than was the case with the ICNT.43 The
figures for limiting production remain essentially the same.44
Substantial progress took place in the area of technology trans-
fer. The proposed new provisions to the ICNT state that technol-
ogy transfer is no longer a condition of contracting. However, a
39. The members agreed to the following procedural rule:
Any modifications or revisions to be made in the Informal Composite Ne-
gotiating Text should emerge from the negotiations themselves and
should not be introduced on the initiative of any single person, whether it
be the President or a Chairman of a Committee, unless presented to the
Plenary and found, from the widespread and substantial support prevail-
ing in Plenary, to offer a substantially improved prospect of a consensus.
1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 17. See note 19 supra.
40. The First Committee was divided into three negotiating groups. The first
group dealt with the system of exploration and exploitation, the second with
financial arrangements, and the third with the organs of the ISA. Id. at 2.
41. However, the language in Article 150 is changed to reflect that the policies
of the Enterprise, especially with regard to protecting developing States, are
"objectives rather than mandates and [help] avoid the implication that the Article
confers any power on the [ISA] other than those contained in other treaty arti-
cles." Id. at 27.
Certain delegates have suggested that each State be allowed a limited number
of sites for its mining representatives. However, the United States takes the posi-
tion that the problem can be resolved "without imposing any artificial restrictions
on who can apply." Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 451, 454 (1979).
At the New York Session, the United States moved to require that well-deline.
ated rules governing the selection of applicants be formulated and that the miners
receive adequate protection. Particularly, the United States advocated the posi-
tion that recovery of the minerals confers title to them. The Committee did not
come to a final agreement on this issue. United States Delegation Report on the
Resumed Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the
Sea, New York, August 21-September 15, 1978, at 7-9 (unpublished report) (on file
with the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as United States Delegation
Report ].
42. Unofficially, the United States represented the developed States' interest,
while Canada, as a mineral producer, represented the developing States. Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, May 12, 1978, at 30, col. 2.
43. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 28. Furthermore, it was agreed that any
limitation on minerals other than the nodule type would "be subject to the proce-
dures set forth in the Convention for entry into force of amendments." Id. at 27.
44. Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans
and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978).
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mining company, after it enters into a contract with the ISA, must
transfer its technology to the Enterprise upon request. The trans-
fer would be based on "good faith on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions, which are to be negotiated by the par-
ties."45 Fewer restrictions were placed on scientific research in
the seabed areas.46
The revisions provide for two methods of distributing income
gained from mining nodules-a royalty-only plan and a nominal
royalty plus profit-sharing plan. Both plans were included to en-
able each contractor to choose whichever plan best fits its socio-
economic system.47 Mining representatives who think their in-
vestment would not be adequately protected remained disap-
pointed with these results.4 8
Finally, the First Committee reached no consensus on changes
in the voting procedures for the ISA.49 The reviewing clause of
the ICNT was revised to eliminate any "automatic conversion" to
45. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 18. Presumably, these terms and condi-
tions would represent market value. Id. at 26.
46. The new provision "eliminates the former mandate of the [ISA] to 'harmo-
nize' and 'coordinate' such research." Id. at 19 (quoting ICNT, supra note 6, art.
143).
47. Id. at 31-32. The Soviet Union is the primary supporter of the royalty-only
plan. The United States supports the profit-sharing plan in order to ensure risk
sharing. Id.
At the New York Session this proposal was somewhat revised. By partially in-
corporating proposals made by Norway and Holland, the Committee formulated a
new plan which provides for an annual fixed fee of one million dollars and for roy-
alty percentage figures for both systems. The royalty percentage figure increases
with time. A "safeguard" clause, which allows the contractor to stay within the
earlier royalty figure until he can recoup his costs, and a provision for a 15% rate
of return are also undecided. United States Delegation Report, supra note 41, at
11-13.
The United States has criticized this plan on three grounds. First, increasing the
quota based upon time assumes that as time goes on, the operation will become
more profitable. This may or may not be the case. Second, an annual fixed fee
does not increase the incentive of a mining concern to be more fiscally responsible
because it already will have invested millions of dollars. Finally, the uncertainties
of seabed mining preclude predicting a rate of return. Id. at 11-14.
48. Representatives of the ocean mining industry met in Geneva shortly after
the Conference ended in order to assess its progress. The representatives found
the results to be unacceptable. S. REP. No. 1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1978). For
a report on the views of the mining companies' representatives, see Law of the
Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arm7s Control, Oceans and International En-
vironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
49. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 54-55. The developing States did not accept
the United States' proposal for chambered voting. Id. at 33-34.
a unitary system.50 The revisions provide that if the Conference
is deadlocked on the operation of the parallel system after five
years, a moratorium on all new contracts shall be imposed.51
The Second Committee met with substantial success on the is-
sue of compulsory settlement of disputes within the EEZ, the sole
issue on which the delegates reached a final consensus. 52 The
main area of contention was between coastal States with substan-
tial fishing interests within their EEZ's and States whose fleets
must fish in foreign waters. The dispute specifically centered on
whether there should be a compulsory conciliation or a binding
settlement to decide fishing disputes.53 The result was a compro-
mise which calls upon a coastal State to accept compulsory con-
ciliation when it has failed in its conservation efforts and has
acted arbitrarily in denying other States fishing rights within its
EEZ.54
The Second Committee made progress on the problem of access
to the EEZ by the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
States (LL/GDS). These States succeeded in obtaining the right
to "an appropriate part of the surplus" within the EEZ, although
no specific amounts were established.55 A differentiation was
made in terms of right of access between the developed and de-
veloping LL/GDS, with the latter gaining preference.56
Committee members proposed many plans for defining the
outer limit of the continental margin, but none were accepted.
57
50. Id. at 29.
51. Id.
52. London Times, May 22, 1978, at 4, col. F. However, India, Indonesia, and
Thailand, concerned at the delay of negotiations, have already agreed to divide a
portion of the Andaman Sea Floor. San Diego Union, June 23, 1978, § A, at 22, col.
4.
53. "A binding procedure is one in which both parties are obliged to accept
and act upon the decision of a neutral third party. Compulsory conciliation in the
context of the present negotiations is a procedure akin to arbitration except that
the result would not bind the parties absolutely." 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at
41.
54. While the arbitrary settlement procedures were not selected, to the disap-
pointment of the LL/GDS, the revision did provide for expanding jurisdiction over
coastal State actions. However, because it must be an abuse by a coastal State
that brings jurisdiction into play, "the text ensures that a coastal state which exer-
cises its powers responsibly cannot be harrassed by disgruntled fishing states."
Id. at 42-43.
55. Id. at 36.
56. Id. at 37.
57. The two basic proposals were the "Irish formula" and one introduced by
the Soviet Union and supported by the Eastern European States. The "Irish
formula" called for delimitation beyond the 200-mile zone at the "base of the conti-
nental slope plus a minimum of 60 miles or, alternatively, the base of the continen-
tal slope and beyond to where the depth of sediments are at least one percent of
the distance between that point and the foot of the slope." Id. at 38. The Soviet
proposal would delimit at a maximum of 100 miles beyond the 200-mile zone. The
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A United States proposal to provide greater protection for marine
mammals received considerable attention, although the Commit-
tee did not act upon it58
The Third Committee made substantial progress on the issue of
ocean pollution. As a result of the Amoco Cadiz oil-spill disas-
ter,-9 the United States proposed the establishment of a tanker
route and warning system to avoid tanker collisions. The Com-
mittee tentatively agreed to accept this proposal.60 The Commit-
tee further agreed upon proposals to allow a coastal State to
arrest a vessel within its EEZ "where there is clear objective evi-
dence that a violation ... has resulted in a discharge which
causes major damage or threat of damage."l6 Also, the Commit-
United States opposed the Soviet plan, fearing that it would ultimately lead to a
300-mile EEZ. Id.
For a discussion of the different methods used in measuring the continental
margins, see Hedberg, Relations of Political Boundaries on the Ocean Floor to the
Continental Margin, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (1976). Professor Hedberg favors the
Irish plan's use of the baseline slope plus an agreed-upon oceanward extension.
Id. at 63.
One dispute regarding the continental shelf delimitation between States has
been resolved. In July, 1977, an international arbitration tribunal in Geneva de-
cided the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case. Britain had claimed that the con-
tinental shelf between the two States should be divided using an equidistant
method measured from certain British-held islands off the coast of Britain. France
claimed that using this method would be unfair because the coastlines should be
used. The Tribunal used a geometric formula that gave France more shelf area
than it would have received had the equidistance method been used. However,
the Tribunal also increased the shelf limitation for those British islands beyond
what Britain would have been received under the French proposal. Wash. Post,
July 26, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 5.
The Tribunal rested its decision upon principles of equity, an important concept
in the development of international law. It also noted that application of the de-
limitation provisions as proposed at UNCLOS III would have resulted in the same
solution. Note, The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf Arbitration, 72 AM.
J. INTr'L L. 95, 111 (1978).
For a comprehensive discussion of this case, see Brown, The Anglo-French Con-
tinental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DIGO L. REV. 461 (1979).
58. United States Delegation Report, supra note 41, at 20.
59. In March, 1978, the supertanker Amoco Cadiz sank off the coast of Brit-
tany. It was "potentially the worst ecological disaster ever to hit the European
coast." NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1978, at 71.
60. London Times, May 22, 1978, at 4, col. F.
61. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 47. This provision goes beyond the ICNT,
which imposed only monetary fines on polluting vessels beyond the territorial wa-
ters. Id.
At the New York Session, the Committee agreed to allow a coastal State to in-
spect within its EEZ "when there is a substantial discharge causing a threat of sig-
nificant pollution and the master has refused to supply information or the
information supplied is at variance with evident facts." United States Delegation
tee agreed that a State can determine whether a vessel within its
territorial sea meets the requirements for port entry of the State
for which it is heading provided that both States are parties to the
agreement. 62 No significant developments transpired on the issue
of scientific research within the EEZ.
An Eighth Session of UNCLOS HI is scheduled to meet in Ge-
neva for six weeks in March, 1979. The potential for its success is
as yet uncertain. However, although many issues remain to be re-
solved, sufficient agreement on most issues has, according to El-
liot Richardson, created "a sufficient incentive for us to strive for
the completion of a Law of the Sea Convention." 63
DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE CONFERENCE
Deep Seabed Mining Legislation Makes Substantial Progress in
Congress
Legislation governing the exploration and exploitation of sea-
bed minerals by American mining companies was introduced in
the 95th session of the United States Congress. The Carter ad-
ministration, unlike previous administrations, supports this type
of legislation,64 partly in the hope of forcing an accommodation at
UNCLOS 11. However, such legislation will not be fully acted
upon until the 96th session of Congress meets in 1979.
Report, supra note 41, at 22. The Committee also agreed to greater protection for
flag States "by ensuring prompt notification to flag states where release of a vessel
has been refused or made conditional along with a reference to the right to seek
release in accordance with the dispute settlement articles." Id. at 22-23.
The United States has already taken unilateral action on this measure. On De-
cember 27, 1977, a bill was passed by Congress and signed by President Carter
which asserts American jurisdiction over polluting violators within its EEZ. Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L No. 95-217, § 58, 91 Stat. 1566. However, passage of the
bill prompted a split within the Carter administration over enforcement of the Act.
The State Department thinks that enforcement of the law will hamper prospects
for agreement at UNCLOS Il. Furthermore, it may lead other States to increase
their degree of jurisdiction over their own EEZ, thus hindering United States na-
val and intelligence activities. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1978, § 1, at 14, col. 2. How-
ever, the State Department reached agreement with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the United States agency responsible for enforcement of the new
law. The EPA agreed to support changes in the law to allow accommodation for
international agreements and to penalize foreign vessels within the American
EEZ only after they have docked at a United States port. Id. Jan. 8, 1978, § 1, at 20,
col 1.
62. 1978 Hearing, supra note 14, at 47-48.
63. Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 451, 459 (1979).
64. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 3. For an in-depth discussion of United
States interests in seabed mining, especially in regard to available resources, the
need for new resources, and the history of American involvement in this issue at
UNCLOS, see SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH, FOREIGN AFFAIS AND NATIONAL DE-
FENSE, AND EcoNomcs DIVISIONS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95TII CONG.,
2D SEss., DEEP SEABED MINERALS: RESOURCES, DIPLOMACY, AND STRATEGIC INTER-
EST (Comm. Print 1978).
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The primary bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate,
H.R. 3350 (Breaux bill),65 set forth a comprehensive management
scheme. The Breaux bill made clear that the United States, by
enacting such legislation, would not be asserting any "sovereignty
or sovereign or exclusive rights over, or the ownership of, any
area of the deep seabed.66 Furthermore, the bill set up an inter-
national revenue-sharing fund for underdeveloped States.
67
Under this bill, the Commerce Department would have author-
ity to regulate mining operations.68 All potential miners would be
required to meet certain requisites before obtaining a mandatory
license for exploration and a mandatory permit for commercial re-
covery.69 The bill provided that licenses would be issued not only
65. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act:
Hearings and Markup on H.R. 3350 Before the Comm. on International Relations
and its Subcomms. on International Organizations and on International Economic
Policy and Trade, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. 3350]. The bill first went before the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries. H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). It was then sent
to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which amended it. See id.
pt. 2. Before the entire House acted upon the bill, it was sent to the House Com-
mittee on International Relations. The House passed the bin; however, the Sen-
ate, pressed for time near the end of its legislative session, failed to consider it.
Congressman Murphy, the Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, considers the probability of passage in the 96th Congress very high.
Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Do-
mestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 552 (1979). See id. at 550-52.
The other major bill designed to create a comprehensive plan for management
and control of seabed mining was H.R. 3652, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) (known as
the Fraser bill). Although the House did not act upon the Fraser bill, many of its
provisions were included in the final version of the Breaux bill. For a detailed
comparison of the two bills, see Ott, An Analysis of Deep Seabed Mining
Legislation, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 591 (1977); Whitney, Environmental Regula-
tion of United States Deep Seabed Mining, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 82-92 (1977).
66. Hearings on H.R. 3350, supra note 65, at 305 (emphasis original). However,
other Congressmen find this to be contradictory to the concept of the "Common
Heritage of Mankind" that the United Nations adopted in 1967. This principle
states that the ocean and its resources are to be shared equitably to benefit all
States. Wash. Post, July 27, 1978, § A, at 18, col. 1.
67. Hearings on H.R. 3350, supra note 65, at 337. This provision was an amend-
ment added to indicate further United States support of UNCLOS III negotiations.
H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1978).
68. H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1978). Some House mem-
bers contested this issue because they thought the Interior Department should
have jurisdiction. Wash. Post, July 27, 1978, § A, at 18, col. 1. The Senate version of
the Breaux bill designated the Secretary of the Interior to review applications and
to issue permits and licenses. S. REP. No. 1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1978).
69. Hearings on H.R. 3350, supra note 65, at 98-99. The licensing requirements
were that miners be financially solvent, that their activities not interfere with the
freedom of the high seas, that the issuance of such a license or permit not conflict
to ships documented under United States laws but also to those
of reciprocating States.70 It recognized reciprocity with other
States that regulate their nationals in the same manner as under
the bill.71 Processing of the minerals might take place only where
the Secretary of Commerce designated.7 2 The bill also would re-
quire the Secretary to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment as to the effect of mining on the deep seabed floor.
73
One issue extensively debated in Congress was that of invest-
ment guarantees for mining companies in the event that a ratified
treaty caused them financial loss. The final bill passed by the
House and the version sent to the Senate did not provide for such
guarantees.7 4
with international obligations, and that the miners cause no threat of damage to
the marine ecosystem. Ott, An Analysis of Deep Seabed Mining Legislation, 10
NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 591, 598 (1977).
The bill also contained a "grandfather" clause for United States mining compa-
nies engaged in exploitation at the time the Act would have taken effect. Hearings
on H.R. 3350, supra at 305-06. This clause would have "allow[ed] those citizens to
continue their exploration activities until the Secretary ha[d] taken action on
their application for license." H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1977). This clause was viewed as necessary because the ICNT contains no guar-
anty of investments for mining companies that will have begun to explore and ex-
ploit when the ICNT becomes effective. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 9, 1978, at 83, 83.
It is estimated that the initial investment to begin a mining operation is $500 to
$700 million. Bus. WEE, July 11, 1977, at 29, 29.
70. Hearings on H.R. 3350, supra note 65, at 310. The Senate bill, S. 2053, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), was at odds -with the House version on this issue. Under
the Senate bill, both mining and processing ships would have had to have been
documented and built in the United States. The Senate Committee thought this
requirement would help shipyard construction in the United States. S. REP. No.
1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1978). However, Senator Griffin (R.-Mich.) strongly
dissented from the Committee's position, viewing the provision as a "new version
of cargo preference" created by the lobbying efforts of the maritime industry. Id.
at 130. The administration opposes flag requirements for ore-transporting vessels.
Richardson, Deep Seabed Mining Legislation, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr., 1978 at 54.
71. Hearings on H.R. 3350, supra note 65, at 332-33.
72. H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978).
73. Id. pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). The ecological problems that deep
seabed mining creates remain unclear, but because the nodules are located so
deep in the ocean, little marine life exists to.be disturbed. Slappey, Who Will
Reap the Mineral Riches of the Deep?, NAnON's Bus., Mar., 1978, at 25, 32. How-
ever, mining might substantially damage the ocean food chain. Leach & Prescott,
Mining the Sea: Phase I, ATLAS, Apr., 1978, at 25, 26.
74. Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1978, at 6, col. 1; Wash. Post, July 27, 1978, § A, at 18, col.
1. Originally, HR. 3350 provided no limit on the amount of compensation available
to the mining industry. The Fraser bill (H.R. 3652) created an insurance scheme
that involved coverage of up to $100 million. Ott, An Analysis of Deep Seabed Min-
ing Legislation, 10 NAT. REsouRcEs LAw. 591, 602-03 (1977). The revised version,
which came out of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, al-
lowed a company to be compensated for the lesser of 90% of its investment or $350
million. H.R. REP. No. 588 pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1977).
The Carter administration strongly opposed such guarantees on the grounds
that the "Federal Government should not provide the precedent of promising in
advance to compensate certain segments of the private sector for financial losses
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States Continue to Adjust to the Unilateral Extension of
Sovereignty over Fishing Waters
States have continued to declare sovereignty over waters ex-
tending 200 miles from their shores.7 5 These States, with the ex-
ception of North Korea, have claimed this extension for economic
purposes only, primarily fishing.76 These States include Haiti,77
East Germany,78 Sweden,7 9 Poland,80 Japan,8 ' Cuba,82 and several
South Pacific States.8 3 Iceland continued to refuse Britain access
that may be occasioned by possible federal actions taken to advance the national
interest." Richardson, Deep Seabed Mining Legislation, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr.,
1978, at 54, 54.
75. For a discussion of States that declared such sovereignty prior to April,
1977, see Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 724-28.
76. On August 1, 1977, North Korea declared a "military sea boundary" 50
miles from its shore. North Korea claimed control over all ships and aircraft in
that area. The United States has refused to recognize such sovereignty. Wash.
Post, Aug. 3, 1977, § A, at 15, col. 1.
77. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1977, § A, at 29, col. 6.
78. Id. Dec. 28, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 4.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. On June 15, 1977, the Japanese cabinet ratified a law passed by the Diet,
Japan's parliament, that increased Japanese territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles
and its fishing zone to 200 miles. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1977, § A, at 12, col. 3. Prior
to enactment of the law, Japanese officials informed both the People's Republic of
China and South Korea that this law would not be enforced against them if they
would extend a similar privilege to Japan. Id. Mar. 30, 1977, § A, at 5, col. 1.
On May 24, 1977, Japan and the Soviet Union reached a temporary agreement
allowing each State to fish within the other's EEZ. L. Times, May 25, 1977, pt. 1,
at 17, col. 1. This agreement was extended for another year until December, 1977,
retaining the 1977 quotas. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 2.
82. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1977, § A, at 1, coL 6.
83. These States and territories include Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Is-
lands, Papua, New Guinea, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga, Western Samoa, Niue, and the Gil-
bert Islands. Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 13, 1978, at 11, col. 1.
All these countries are members of the regional South Pacific Forum. The Fo-
rum has established the Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency to administer the 200-
mile zone among the members. The Agency will also negotiate with foreign fish-
ing States in regard to licensing procedures. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1977, § A, at 14, col.
3. Foreign States have already begun to show interest in developing joint ventures
and in providing loans and other economic assistance to the Agency. Christian
Sci. Monitor, Apr. 3, 1978, at 11, col. 1.
The Agency has invited both France and the United States to join the Agency
because both have territorial possessions in the area. However, American law
does not recognize State sovereignty over highly migratory species of fish such as
tuna, which is abundant in this South Pacific area. Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 12,
1978, at 11, col. 1. A further problem is that current United States law would have
to be changed to allow American Samoa, a United States possession, to join the
Agency. Id. Sept. 29, 1977, at 26, col. 1.
The establishment of this Agency is in agreement with one commentator's rec-
to its fishing waters, 84 and Ireland failed in its attempt to estab-
lish a totally exclusive fishing zone.85
The United States encountered many problems posed by pas-
sage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(FCMA).86 These problems included violations within American
fishing waters, readjustment of fishing boundaries between the
United States and other States, foreign influence in the American
fishing industry, and the determination of quota allocations.
While most States complied with the provisions of this Act,8
7
ommendation for such a program. This commentator sets forth the benefits that
these States will derive from a united organization representing their interests.
The author notes finally that this type of organization goes further than anything
established in the ICNT because it protects the interests of self-governing territo-
ries that are part of the Agency. These territories cannot be a party to the ICNT.
Ramp, Regional Law of the Sea: A Proposal for the Pacific, 18 VA. J. INVr'L L. 121
(1977).
84. British ships were banned from Iceland's fishery zone as of January 1,
1977. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 729-30. Although Iceland agreed
to meet with representatives of the European Economic Community (EEC) in an
attempt to work out an agreement, the meetings were fruitless. An explanation
may be that Iceland's fishery waters contain more fish than the EEC waters.
London Times, June 11, 1977, at 3, col. H.
85. Ireland had announced that it would create an exclusive fishery zone 50 to
100 miles outward. It banned large-sized boats from its water, giving its small-boat
fishing fleet a monopoly in the area. London Times, Apr. 2, 1977, at 2, col. G. How-
ever, the European Court of Justice declared the ban "discriminatory and in
breach of the [EEC] treaty." This ruling is expected to strengthen considerably
the EEC's power to act against excessive restrictions imposed by member States.
Id. Feb. 17, 1978, at 5, col. F. Both Britain and Ireland had strongly favored such
restrictions because a large portion of EEC fisheries is in those waters. Id. May
12, 1977, at 7, col. E.
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976), as amended by Act of Aug. 28, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519. For a discussion of the provisions of the Act, see Recent
Developments, supra note 1, at 727-29. In 1977 foreign fishing within the United
States' 200-mile limit declined by 35%. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1978, at 8, col. 4.
87. In 1978, foreign States will pay the United States approximately $10.1 mil-
lion in fishing fees, of which Japan's share will be the greatest. Wall St. J., Feb. 16,
1978, at 1, col. 5. Agreements have been drafted between the United States and
several other States regarding their rights within the 200-mile American zone. An
agreement between the United States and the EEC was reached on February 15,
1977. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Feb. 15,
1977, United States-European Economic Community, [1976-77] 28 U.S.T. 3787,
T.I.A.S. No. 8598; H.R. Doc. No. 80, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). The EEC was
criticized for not taking a strong enough position when negotiating with the United
States, particularly with respect to purportedly excessive fees sought by the
United States. L.A. Times, May 15, 1977, pt. 6, at 17, col. 1.
The United States signed an agreement with Japan on March 18, 1977, Agree-
ment Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Mar. 18, 1977,
United States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 8728; H.R. Doc. No. 79, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1977), with the Soviet Union on November 26, 1976, Agreement Concerning Fish-
eries Off the Coasts of the United States, Nov. 26, 1976, United States-Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, [1976-77] 28 U.S.T. 1847, T.I.A.S. No. 8528; H.R. Doc. No. 36,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), and with Mexico on August 26, 1977, Agreement Con-
cerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Aug. 26, 1977, United States-
Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 8852; 123 CONG. REC. S16,712 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1977).
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there were significant violations by the Soviet Union following the
first few months of its enactment.88
The United States and Canada experienced disagreements re-
garding both States' extensions to a 200-mile fishing limit. In
early May, 1978, American fisherman on the west coast obtained
an injunction barring Canadian boats from fishing for salmon in
United States waters.89 Negotiations between the two States to
resolve this issue failed. Canada then withdrew from a 1978 in-
terim agreement with the United States0 and ordered all Ameri-
can fishing ships out of Canadian waters.91 The United States
retaliated by banning all Canadian vessels from American wa-
ters.92 However, talks resumed, and removal of the bans ap-
peared imminent when legislation was enacted and signed by
On April 27, 1977, Cuba and the United States signed a fishing agreement that
creates an interim boundary between the two States. Agreement Concerning
Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Apr. 27, 1977, United States-Cuba,
T.IA.S. No. 8689. The boundary line lies essentially midway between the two
.States. 76 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 687 (1977). For the boundary's precise coordinates, see
42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977). The agreement gives Cuban fishing vessels some access
to American waters. The United States is to determine the allowable catch, and
American observers are to be allowed on board Cuban vessels. Cuba also agreed
to allow American ships some access to Cuban waters. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1977,
§ A, at 22, col. 2.
88. As of early April, 1977, the United States had issued 97 violations and cita-
tions to foreign fishing fleets, the bulk of them going to the Soviets. However,
there were no seizures. Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 2. Following the
seizure of the Russian trawler Taras Shevchenko on April 10, 1977, and amid
charges of lax enforcement, President Carter issued a strong warning to the Sovi-
ets. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1977, § A, at 30, col. 1. The Soviet Union subsequently or-
dered its ships to abide strictly by the law. Id. Apr. 15, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 2.
89. In ordering the ban, the district court ruled that a 1978 interim agreement
between the United States and Canada was invalid because of lack of congres-
sional approval. The court stayed the injunction, however, to allow such legisla-
tion pending before the Congress to be passed. Wall St. J., May 23, 1978, at 18, col.
2. The 1978 agreement is similar to the 1977 one. Id. The 1977 agreement is re-
printed in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAIs 590 (1977).
90. Under the 1978 accord, Canadian fisheries were allowed greater access to
United States fishing grounds. Wall St. J., May 23, 1978, at 18, col. 2. Canada
agreed to an American request to ban fishing in Canadian waters for two months
to allow the salmon to cross into United States waters to spawn. Id. However, Ca-
nada failed to carry out this agreement for almost a month on the grounds that
these conservatory measures were not needed. Id. This failure led to the injunc-
tion. The United States did not comply with its obligation to allow Canadian
fishermen greater access to American salmon grounds. Id.
91. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1978, § A, at 5, col. 2. In 1977, the United States Fisher-
ies Management Council for the Northwest lowered the quota of salmon available
to Canadians. In retaliation, Canada closed its shrimping grounds off Vancouver
Island. Wall St. J., May 23, 1978, at 18, col. 2.
92. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1978, § A, at 5, col. 2.
President Carter in July, 1978.93 This legislation gives President
Carter authority to lift the ban on Canadian ships if Canada recip-
rocates.9 4 Negotiations will continue toward a comprehensive set-
tlement on boundaries and fishing rights between the two
States.9 5
Problems have arisen over attempts by certain foreign States,
such as Japan and South Korea, to invest in United States fishing
fleets. These investments and the resultant control of American
fishing boats allow foreigners to bypass the quota imposed under
the FCMA, which was designed to protect American fishermen.9 6
Legislation has been introduced in Congress that would limit
such foreign investment.97 Similarly, foreign processing ships
have been purchasing large quantities of fish caught by American
vessels.98 However, Congress enacted legislation in 1978 that
gives United States fish processors first rights to process fish by
limiting the amount of fish that can be sold to foreign proces-
sors.9 9
Finally, there have been, and will no doubt continue to be, chal-
lenges to the administrative process created by the FCMA.100 In
93. Id. July 2, 1978, § A, at 14, col. 4. Act of July 1, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-314, 92
Stat. 376.
94. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1978, § A, at 14, col. 4.
95. The East coast boundaries present problem areas other than salmon fish-
ing, particularly cod fishing in the Georges Bank off the coast of Maine. Canada
claims that part of the Georges Bank is within its EEZ. The United States main-
tains that the Georges Bank "is an undersea extension of Cape Cod" and there-
fore entirely under American jurisdiction. Id. June 26, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 1.
96. Under the FCMA of 1976, the only requirements that foreign investors
must meet are that their ships be built in the United States and that a majority of
the members on corporate boards of directors of United States fishing fleets be
American citizens. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 3, 1977, at 3, col. 1. Japanese inter-
ests have already invested heavily in American fishery concerns. N.Y. Times, Apr.
20, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 1.
97. Representatives Au Coin (D.-Or.) and Studds (D.-Mass.) introduced legis-
lation to amend the FCMA. Their bill required foreign ownership in American
fishing fleets to be less than 25% for the vessels to be considered American-owned.
Foreigners who continuously owned such ships prior to June 27, 1977, were ex-
empted. H.R. 2564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
98. Under the FCMA of 1976, the quotas as to foreigners apply only to the
amount they catch and not to the processing of fish. Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 8,
col. 2. Many States have been negotiating joint ventures with American fishing
boats whereby American fishermen would catch the fish and then sell it to the for-
eign processors. The United States imported $2.5 billion worth of fish products
from foreign States. Id. Aug. 16, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
99. Foreign processors are allowed to buy only that amount of fish that Ameri-
can processors will not or cannot handle. Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1978, at 7, col. 1. This
law is in the form of an amendment to the FCMA. See Act of Aug. 28, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519.
100. The Act provides for eight regional fishery councils to determine manage-
ment plans. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 729. For a discussion on
how these regional councils make their determinations, see Knight, Management
Procedures in the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone, 2 MARINE POL'Y 22 (1978). The
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Maine v. Kreps,lOl Maine claimed that the quota allocated to
foreign fishing fleets was too high.O2 After a federal district court
dismissed the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit remanded the case and directed the district court to
order the Secretary of Commerce to show reasons behind the
quota allocation.10 3 On remand the district court found the Secre-
tary's determination to be correct, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. The court of appeals stated that the Secretary, in
establishing quotas, could take into consideration the effect such
a quota may have on international relations.1
04
Panama Canal Treaty Signed
On September 7, 1977, the United States and Panama success-
fully concluded negotiations on a treaty to restore Panamanian
control over the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.105 The treaty is
comprised of two parts-the Canal Treaty, which hands over con-
author notes several potential problem areas created by the Act, including the po-
tential conflict between the federal government and the states because of the gov-
ernment's interests in allowing foreign fishing within American waters and the
fishing of tuna by foreign fleets. Id. at 27-29.
101. No. 77-45 (S.D. Me. July 18, 1977), remanded, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir.), aff'd,
563 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir. 1977).
102. Comment, Foreign Fishing Quotas and Administrative Discretion Under
the 200-Mile Limit Act, 58 B.U. L. REV. 95, 97 (1978). The United States Secretary
of Commerce, pursuant to the FCMA, had determined that the optimum yield
should be lowered to conserve the herring stock off the New England coast. The
Secretary's figures corresponded with those of the International Convention for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. This group is made up of 11 States which have
agreed to comply with existing fishing quotas. Id. at 96-99. Under the FCMA, the
optimum yield is that amount which will provide an overall benefit to the nation.
It is to be based on the maximum sustainable yield, which "is a strictly biological
determination of the largest volume of fish that can be harvested annually without
diminishing the size of a particular stock." Id. at 98.
103. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1051-52 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir.
1977).
104. The court had determined in its first hearing that this factor of "greatest
overall benefit to the Nation" could "include such national benefit as one to be de-
rived from permitting foreign fishing." Id. at 1049. The court reiterated this view
in the second hearing. Id. at 1054.
This view, however, has been criticized as inconsistent with the FCMA itself.
One commentator states that the United States Congress did not intend the inter-
national benefits of allowing foreign fishing in American waters to be a factor in
determining quotas. Rather, the main intent was conservation of the nation's
fisheries. Therefore, he concludes, the Secretary's use of this factor was improper.
Comment, Foreign Fishing Quotas and Administrative Discretion Under the 200-
Mile Limit Act, 58 B.U. L. REV. 95 (1978).
105. The treaty and related documents are set forth in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALs 1021 (1977).
trol of the Canal and Canal Zone to Panama, and the Neutrality
Treaty, which deals with the status of the Canal after Panama as-
sumes full control.106
The Canal Treaty calls for full control of the Canal by Panama
after 1999. Until that time the Canal will operate under American
control but with both American and Panamanian participation.107
When the treaty becomes effective six months after formal ratifi-
cation, Panama will assume jurisdiction of the Zone over a thirty-
month period.08 The United States and Panama also agreed not
to negotiate with any other State concerning the building of an-
other canal. 09 Finally, the United States is to provide military de-
fense for the Canal until the year 2000. In 2000 a board consisting
of both Americans and Panamanians will be established to govern
defense matters." 0
The Neutrality Treaty provides that Panama will keep the Ca-
nal open to "peaceful transit" for all States, including transit for
warships."' After 1999, both the United States and Panama shall
have the right to defend the Canal militarily against any external
threats." 2
Senate ratification of the treaty provided one of the most con-
troversial recent political issues in the United States. On March
16, 1978, the Senate ratified the Neutrality Treaty, which included
a reservation introduced by Senator De Concini (D.-Ariz.) that
would permit American military intervention after 2000 should
the threat of internal disorder threaten the Canal's closing."13
Panama sharply criticized this provision and threatened not to
ratify the entire treaty." 4 When the Canal Treaty came up for a
106. For a history of the background of the negotiations, see SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE PANAMA CANAL 3 (Comm. Print 1977). See also SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS, SENATE COM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PROPOSED
PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: A DIGEST OF INFORMATION 3 (Comm. Print 1978). For
the complete hearings, see Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings on Executive N
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pts. 1-5
(1977-1978); Panama Canal Treaty (Disposition of United States Territory): Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pts. 1-4 (1977-1978).
107. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 5.
108. Id. Formal ratification will occur either by March 1, 1979, or when Con-
gress approves implementing legislation, whichever comes earlier. Id. June 17,
1978, § A, at 1, col. 6.
109. Id. Apr. 19, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 5. However, the Senate passed a measure




113. Id. Mar. 17, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 6.
114. Id. Apr. 11, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3. Opponents of the treaty in the Senate and
House also took steps to secure its defeat. The Senate considered and rejected a
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Senate vote, the same reservation was offered, l l5 but a compro-
mise was reached. The De Concini reservation was retained, but
another provision was added which provides that United States
intervention will be permitted solely for the purpose of keeping
the Canal open-not to interfere with Panamanian internal af-
fairs. This compromised version of the Canal Treaty was subse-
quently passed by the Senate and accepted by Panama.n 6
Finally, on June 16, 1978, President Carter and General Torrijos,
President of Panama, formally signed the treaty, thus ending thir-
teen years of negotiations." 7
Antarctic Treaty States Meet to Determine the Future of
Antarctica
Representatives from the thirteen States party to the Antarctic
Treaty of 1955118 met in London in September, 1977, to draft plans
for the management of this region." 9 This meeting dealt primar-
ily with the issues of oil exploration20 and the harvesting of the
small, shrimp-like krill that are found in abundant numbers in the
Antarctic Ocean. The parties called for a ban on oil exploration
and for the promulgation of regulations by each party to limit its
catch of krill.' 2 1 The delegates drafted agreements on these meas-
proposal that would have required House approval for disposal of American prop-
erty in the Canal Zone. Id. Apr. 6, 1978, § A, at 11, col. 6. Opponents also chal-
lenged disposition in the courts. However, the federal court of appeals upheld the
Senate's action. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
115. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1978, § A, at 1, col 4.
116. Id. Apr. 19, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 6.
117. Id. The Instruments of Ratification, along with the Amendments, Condi-
tions and Reservations to the Treaty, are reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATEIMS
817 (1978).
118. Signed Dec. 1, 1959, [19611 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The States that are parties to the Treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, East Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE
LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 260 (1978).
119. Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4.
120. Id. However, the fear of oil exploration was lessened when a report sub-
mitted to the Conference estimated that it will be 15 to 25 years before exploration
can begin. London Times, Oct. 4, 1977, at 7, col. A.
121. London Times, Oct. 11, 1977, at 6, col. F. The principal harvesters of the
krill are the Soviet Union and Japan. Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4.
The United States supports the ban on oil exploration and has suggested guide-
lines by which the Antarctic's unique ecosystem should be protected. One such
guideline is the creation of an international regime comprised of representatives
from treaty States and from non-treaty States that have a direct interest in the re-
ures when they subsequently met in Canberra, Australia, in
March, 1978.122 The drafted agreement provides for a Commission
to set annual quotas 123 and for inspectors to monitor compliance
of member States.12 4 The delegates did not agree upon financing
and voting procedures of the Commission125 and took no action
on the various claims of sovereignty made over the Antarctic. 126
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization Reaches
Agreement on Oil Tanker Pollution Control
Prompted by the recent rash of oil tanker spills, the Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) reached
an agreement to control tanker spillage, 2 7 to take full effect in
gion. This body would control all elements of the ecosystem except for whales
and seals. Its duties would include the gathering and analyzing of data and the
development and enforcement of conservation measures. Mink, Oceans: Antarctic
Resource and Environmental Concerns, DEPT ST. BULL., Apr., 1978, at 51, 52-53.
122. N.Y. Times, March 24, 1978, § A, at 8, col. 1.
123. Id.
124. Controversy continues as to the nationality of such inspectors. Id.
125. The United States is opposed to the prorating of costs based on the
formula used in the United Nations. Id.
126. States claiming territorial sovereignty over part of Antarctica are Argen-
tina, Australia, Great Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway. Both the
Soviet Union and the United States refuse to recognize any of these claims and
make none themselves. Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1977, § A, at 22, col. 1. The Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 puts a freeze on any claims of territorial sovereignty. The Antartic
Treaty, signed Dec. 1, 1959, art. 4, [1961] 12 U.S.T 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71.
Because of the complexity of such claims it has been suggested that the man-
agement of the Antarctic be placed under an international organization rather
than under only those States that are parties to the treaty, most of which have ter-
ritorial claims. Note, Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the
Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804, 807 (1978). The author of this Note de-
scribes and analyzes the various theories of sovereignty that States have claimed
over the Antarctic. The author concludes that the parties to the Antarctic Treaty
are too interested in their own territorial and economic claims and thus that an
international regime over the Antarctic needs to be established, probably under
the guidance of the United Nations.
127. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1978, at 12, col. 3. Approximately 85-90% of oil spilled
into the oceans results from tanker discharge. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1978, § A, at 9,
col. 1. The Carter administration had previously called for stricter standards for
oil tankers entering United States ports. These standards called for double bot-
toms on new tankers and a segregated ballast system, an inert gas system to pre-
vent dangerous fuel vapor from exploding, back-up radar, and improved
emergency steering on all tankers. Carter, President Announces Measures to Con-
trol Marine Oil Pollution, 76 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 422, 422-23 (1977).
Congress has already taken action on this matter. The Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978, Pub. I No. 95-474, § 5, 92 Stat. 1471, introduced by Senator Magnuson
(D.-Wash.), includes the same regulations that President Carter has called for.
This bill is in the form of an amendment to the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976). The Senate passed the bill on May 26, 1977.
Wall St. J., May 27, 1977, at 4, col. 4. For a discussion of the legislation, see S. REP.
No. 176, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House also passed this measure as
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1985.128 Debate focused on which method should be utilized to
prevent oil discharge at sea by ships. An American proposal
would have required a double bottom for all new ships and a seg-
regated ballast tank on both new and existing vessels.129 A less
expensive proposal by Great Britain called for a system to clean
the tanks safely rather than for a segregated ballast tank.130
IMCO agreed that such tanks should be required on new tankers
and that either system may be used for existing ships.13 ' There is
no requirement, however, for double bottoms.132 Standards for
steering, radar, avoidance of vapor fuel explosions, and inspection
were also agreed upon.133
IMCO representatives held another meeting in July, 1978, to de-
velop qualification standards for captains and crews of ships. The
agreement establishes stricter training standards than those cur-
rently in force in several maritime States.
Mediterranean States Fail to Agree on a Comprehensive Plan to
Prevent Pollution of the Mediterranean
In October, 1977, legal scholars and technicians representing the
Mediterranean States met in Italy under the sponsorship of the
United Nations. Their objective was to draft general principles
that would minimize pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, caused
primarily by land-based sources.134 Participants plan to divide
harmful pollutants into two categories, a "black" list and a "gray"
amended in the form of H.R. 13311, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), on September 12,
1978. See H.R. REP. No. 1384, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pts. 1-2 (1978).
128. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,886, 16,887 (1978). The Senate must still ratify the conven-
tion, but it is expected to do so. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1978, at 12, col. 4.
129. London Times, Feb. 7, 1978, at 4, col. C. The American proposal would have
applied to all tankers weighing more than 20,000 tons. L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1978, pt.
3, at 8, col. 1.
130. The British claim that this Crude Oil Washing (COW) system is both
cheaper and more environmentally sound than a segregated ballast system. The
COW system uses oil sprays rather than water to clean out the tanks. London
Times, Feb. 6, 1978, at 15, col. A.
131. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,886 (1978). The agreement is reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 546 (1978). The segregated ballast tank applies to new ships of over
20,000 tons and to existing ships of over 45,000 tons. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,886 (1978).
132. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,886 (1978).
133. Id.; London Times, June 7, 1978, at 3, col D.
134. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 4. In February, 1977, 16 of the 18
Mediterranean States drew up a preliminary agreement in Athens, Greece, to con-
trol land-based pollution. Id. Oct. 22, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 4. For the draft of this
preliminary agreement, see U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG. 6/6 (1976), reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 958 (1977). In July, 1977, these States met in Monte Carlo to es-
list. 35 The black list would contain substances that are not to be
discharged into the Mediterranean,136 while the gray list would
contain substances that may be discharged only in certain
amounts and under governmental supervision.137 Unfortunately,
the delegates were unable to reach agreement when they met in
Monaco in January, 1978.138 Many States thought that the cost of
regulating their land-based industries would be too high.139
Conference Reviews Seabed Treaty
The first review conference of the 1972 Seabed Treaty met in
Geneva in June, 1977.140 The treaty prohibits nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction from emplacement on the seabed
beyond the territorial limits of States.141 The Conference pro-
duced a Final Declaration which stated that the provisions of the
treaty had been "faithfully observed" by all parties.142 Although
the Conference rejected a Japanese proposal to establish an inter-
national program for verification,143 a review procedure to monitor
technological advancements in this area was implemented.144 Fi-
nally, the delegates agreed to convene another review session in
tablish findings and conclusions based upon scientific data. London Times, Jan. 9,
1977, at 4, col. F.
It is estimated that 90% of the pollution in the Mediterranean Sea comes from
land-based sources. Id. The problem is further compounded because there is only
one outlet for the Mediterranean waters, the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus, it takes
approximately 80 years before a complete change of water occurs. Wash. Post,
Sept. 4, 1977, § A, at 31, col. 1.
135. N.Y. Times, Oct., 22, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 4.
136. Id. Among others, these substances include mercury, DDT, plastics, and
radioactive wastes. Id.
137. Id.
138. London Times, Jan. 16, 1978, at 4, col. F. However, three agreements
reached in Barcelona, Spain, in February, 1976, by these States came into force on
Feburary 12, 1978. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Mar., 1978, at 33, 33. These agreements
provided for oil pollution control by ships and by land-based sources in the Medi-
terranean. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 733-34.
139. It has been estimated that the cost of such a comprehensive plan may be
between $30 and $40 million. Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1977, § A, at 31, col. 1. However,
the value of the fishing and tourist industries in this region has been estimated to
be $800 million annually. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 31, 1977, at 32, 32.
140. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., July, 1977, at 18, 18.
141. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
142. U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., July, 1977, at 18, 18. The verification procedures are
complicated. If one party is suspicious of the activities of another, the com-
plaining party must first consult with the party suspected of a violation. If this
complaint is of no avail, the complainant is then to inform the other parties to the
treaty. Finally, if this step accomplishes nothing, the complaining party may bring
it to the attention of the United Nations Security Council. V~yrynen, The Sea-Bed
Treaty Reviewed, 34 WORLD TODAY 236, 237 (1978).
143. Vayrynen, The Sea-Bed Treaty Reviewed, 34 WORLD TODAY 236, 239 (1978).
144. Id. at 241. Specifically, it calls for the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
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1982.145
International Whaling Commission Takes Steps to Preserve the
Oceans' Whales
The International Whaling Commission (IWC), which met in
June, 1977, made progress in reducing the number of whales that
can be killed.146 The IWC voted to reduce the quotas for whale
hunting by thirty-six percent.147 It also prohibited the killing of
all bowhead whales, a controversial issue within the United
States.148 The IWC met again in June, 1978, but produced no no-
armament, an independent group dedicated to disarmament, to set up an "expert
committee" on this matter. Id.
145. The treaty itself calls for a review conference to determine the effective-
ness of the treaty's enforcement five years after it takes effect. U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON., July, 1977, at 18, 18. However, the United States thought that because
there is little danger of an expansion of the arms race to the seabed floor, a review
conference should be held only when circumstances call for it. Vfiyrynen, The Sea-
Bed Treaty Reviewed, 34 WORLD TODAY 236, 243 (1978). However, some think that
the development of seabed mining may necessitate regular review conferences.
Id.
146. The United States had previously taken such action within its EEZ. On
October 18, 1977, President Carter signed legislation barring commercial whaling
within American waters. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 3. The Act is in
the form of an amendment to the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act. See Pub.
L. No. 95-136, § 4, 91 Stat. 1167 (1977). For a comprehensive analysis on the devel-
opment of whaling law and the shortcomings and alternatives to the present world
regulatory structure, see Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dol-
phins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (pts. 1-2), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q.
323, 574 (1977).
147. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 27, 1977, at 3, col. 4. The most significant cut-
back occurred in sperm whale killing. The kill quota was reduced by 90% in the
North Pacific. Id. However, prompted by the Soviet Union and Japan, the two ma-
jor whaling States, the 1WC increased the sperm whale quota by approximately
850%. L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1977, pt. 1, at 5, col. 1. Subsequently, both Japan and the
Soviet Union agreed to these quotas. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1977, § A, at 16, col. 4.
However, the Soviet Union has announced that it plans to cease all commercial
whaling operations within the next five years. L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 1978, pt. 1, at 1,
coL 2.
148. This ban prompted the Eskimos to seek legal redress. On October 21, 1977,
Judge John Sirica of the federal district court for Washington, D.C., issued a tem-
porary restraining order that the State Department file an objection to the ban
with the IWC. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1977, § 1, at 25, col. 5. The decision was ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court refused to overturn the court of appeals. Id.
Oct. 25, 1977, § A, at 18, col. 6. The United States, prompted by this action, per-
suaded the IWC to allow the Eskimos to hunt about one-half of the previous year's
quota of the bowhead. Id. Dec. 8, 1977, § A, at 21, col. 1. There have been some
questions raised as to why the United States decided to allow the IWC to set these
quotas because the Eskimos' activities were already regulated under existing
table changes, although it increased the quotas for certain
whales.149 The IWC took no action, however, on a proposal calling
for a ten-year moratorium on all whale hunting.l5o
Dispute Between Chile and Argentina over Islands
In 1977, a 100 year-old dispute between Chile and Argentina
over three small islands in the Beagle Channel'51 appeared to be
resolved in favor of Chile. 152 In 1971, both sides agreed to submit
their case to an international arbitration panel, with Great Britain
as the final decisionmaker.153 In May, 1977, Britain announced
that the panel had determined that the islands belonged to
Chile.154 Argentina rejected the decision, primarily because it
would further extend Chile's EEZ to the south.155 It remains un-
certain what effect this rejection will have on the relations be-
tween the two States.
56
CONCLUSION
Between March, 1977, and December, 1978, many significant
events have occurred in the Law of the Sea. UNCLOS III contin-
ues to dominate the limelight in its attempt to draft a comprehen-
sive plan to govern the world's oceans. Because of the impasse
that occurred on the issue of seabed mining, the success of UN-
CLOS III is uncertain. However, in light of its substantial pro-
American law banning commercial whaling. Storro-Patterson, The Bowhead Is-
sue-Harpoon Aimed at the U.S., 11 OcEANs 63 (1978).
149. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1978, § A, at 5, col. 1. In December, 1978, the IWC de-
creased the quota for sperm whales by 41%. L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1978, pt. 1, at 5,
col. 1.
150. Id.
151. Wash. Post, May 3, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 2. The Beagle Channel is at the
southern tip of South America. In 1881, Chile and Argentina signed a treaty divid-
ing the Channel Islands between the two States based upon the channel's flow
pattern. Treaty on the Boundary Between the Argentine Republic and Chile, July
23, 1881, Argentina-Chile, 12 Martens Nouveau Recuell (2d Series) 491. However,
because there are so many islands in this channel, a dispute exists as to which
course the channel actually flows.
152. Wash. Post, May 3, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 2.
153. Id.
154. For the complete decision, see Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v.
Chile), 17 INT'L LEGAL MARtuLs 632 (1977).
155. Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1978, § A, at 21, col. 1. It is believed that large reserves
of oil lie beneath the area between these islands and Antarctica. Id.
156. Viewing the threat of war between the two States as a distinct possibility,
Pope John Paul II announced in December, 1978, that he would send a special em-
issary to mediate the dispute. Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 5.
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gress on other issues, it is hoped that UNCLOS H will succeed in
creating the most comprehensive world agreement ever reached.
RIcHARD PAuL SIREF

